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In this chapter, Dewey's theory of law—its nature, authority, and legitimacy—is brought to the surface. It is argued that, from his entirely general pragmatist account of knowledge as seen through the lens of human inquiry, we find a promising theory not only of how we can make sense of getting things right in ethics but also in the law. Detours are taken to the work of James, Peirce, and Holmes, and, in the end, we find that Dewey builds on his pragmatist predecessors to offer a trulydoi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190491192.013.11 fatcat:lijtmtziovhj5evs3rhw5hla7a