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The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information
2004
Social Science Research Network
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The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo (1994) to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is never empty, even
doi:10.2139/ssrn.724230
fatcat:qrmziyuzknentdnhxhvabmlsdu