The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information

Geoffrey de Clippel
2004 Social Science Research Network  
The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo (1994) to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson (1978)'s coarse core. It is never empty, even
more » ... hough it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.724230 fatcat:qrmziyuzknentdnhxhvabmlsdu