Generalized Feistel Schemes (GFS) are important components of symmetric ciphers, which have been extensively researched in classical setting. However, the security evaluations of GFS in quantum setting are rather scanty. In this paper, we give more improved polynomial-time quantum distinguishers on Type-1 GFS in quantum chosen-plaintext attack (qCPA) setting and quantum chosen-ciphertext attack (qCCA) setting. In qCPA setting, we give new quantum polynomial-time distinguishers on (3d − 3)-round

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... Type-1 GFS with branches d ≥ 3, which gain d − 2 more rounds than the previous distinguishers. Hence, we could get better key-recovery attacks, whose time complexities gain a factor of 2 . In qCCA setting, we get (3d − 3)-round quantum distinguishers on Type-1 GFS, which gain d − 1 more rounds than the previous distinguishers. In addition, we give some quantum attacks on CAST-256 block cipher. We find 12-round and 13round polynomial-time quantum distinguishers in qCPA and qCCA settings, respectively, while the best previous one is only 7 rounds. Hence, we could derive quantum key-recovery attack on 19-round CAST-256. While the best previous quantum key-recovery attack is on 16 rounds. When comparing our quantum attacks with classical attacks, our result also reaches 16 rounds on CAST-256 with 128-bit key under a competitive complexity.