Mis-operation Resistant Searchable Homomorphic Encryption

Keita Emura, Takuya Hayashi, Noboru Kunihiro, Jun Sakuma
2017 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security - ASIA CCS '17  
Let us consider a scenario that a data holder (e.g., a hospital) encrypts a data (e.g., a medical record) which relates a keyword (e.g., a disease name), and sends its ciphertext to a server. We here suppose not only the data but also the keyword should be kept private. A receiver sends a query to the server (e.g., average of body weights of cancer patients). Then, the server performs the homomorphic operation to the ciphertexts of the corresponding medical records, and returns the resultant
more » ... hertext. In this scenario, the server should NOT be allowed to perform the homomorphic operation against ciphertexts associated with different keywords. If such a mis-operation happens, then medical records of different diseases are unexpectedly mixed. However, in the conventional homomorphic encryption, there is no way to prevent such an unexpected homomorphic operation, and this fact may become visible after decrypting a ciphertext, or as the most serious case it might be never detected. To circumvent this problem, in this paper, we propose misoperation resistant homomorphic encryption, where even if one performs the homomorphic operations against ciphertexts associated with keywords ω ′ and ω, where ω = ω ′ , the evaluation algorithm detects this fact. Moreover, even if one (intentionally or accidentally) performs the homomorphic operations against such ciphertexts, a ciphertext associated with a random keyword is generated, and the decryption algorithm rejects it. So, the receiver can recognize such a mis-operation happens in the evaluation phase. In addition to mis-operation resistance, we additionally adopt secure search functionality for keywords since it is desirable when one would like to delegate homomorphic operations to a third party. So, we call the proposed primitive mis-operation resistant searchable homomorphic encryption (MR-SHE). We also give our implementation result of inner products of encrypted vectors. In the case when both vectors are encrypted, the running time of the receiver is millisecond order for relatively small-dimensional (e.g., 2 6 ) vectors. In the case when one vector is encrypted, the running time of the receiver is approximately 5 msec even for relatively high-dimensional (e.g., 2 13 ) vectors.
doi:10.1145/3052973.3053015 dblp:conf/ccs/Emura0KS17 fatcat:gqmldgya45e5loidsyfesvpdey