This paper analyses typical situations which exist before and after an election. First, the incumbent and his or her challenger make choices that affect the election results. Second, the election itself determines who wins. Third, the loser may or may not accept defeat. If the defeat is not accepted, either a standoff or a coalition between the incumbent and challenger follows. We assume that the incumbent directs his or her resources into the following activities, which affect the chance of

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... ning an election: production, fighting with the challenger, and providing public goods. Similarly, the challenger directs his or her resources into production and fighting with the incumbent. We examine six possible election outcomes based on whether the incumbent wins, the challenger wins, and whether a standoff or coalition arises after either one of the players wins. We draw conclusions about the effect of the various choices which the incumbent and challenger make. Our analysis is mapped to and tested against empirical data from 51 African elections held between 2006 and 2011 (including one in Eritrea in 1993, which are classified into the six outcomes. A variety of regression results are determined. For example, the current empirical material shows that the election outcome depends crucially on fighting between the incumbent and challenger, and less on public goods provision to the population.