Thought Insertion Clarified [book]

Matthew Ratcliffe
2018 The MIT Press  
This chapter begins by considering the possibility that a number of factors contribute to the sense of being in an intentional state, and that these can come into conflict. The remainder of the chapter argues that thought insertion (TI) and certain kinds of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH) are to be understood in this way. There is a difference between experiencing a process of thinking as alien and experiencing thought content as alien. It is argued that TI involves the latter. Hence it
more » ... atter. Hence it could just as well be described as experiencing one's own thought contents in a strange, perception-like way. To further support this interpretation, the chapter considers AVHs and shows that a substantial proportion of experiences that are described in AVH terms can equally be conveyed in terms of TI. What we have is an anomalous experience that lies somewhere between thinking and perceiving. The content of the experience continues to resemble that of a thought. Even so, a sense of perceiving predominates. The chapter concludes by arguing that it is unhelpful to conceive of AVH / TI in terms of a distinction between agency and subjectivity or ownership.
doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262036719.003.0003 fatcat:uqsuhvtoifguhoz6wj5lkpll7i