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Defending Pragmatic Epistemic Instrumentalism: A Pragmatic Account of Epistemic Normativity
[thesis]
2020
unpublished
Preserved Fulltext
We often criticize people for having beliefs that are not sufficiently supported by the total available evidence. We do this even if those beliefs are instrumental to satisfying their desires. This leads to a question: why should people care about following the evidence, especially when doing so is not instrumental to getting what they want? The purpose of this dissertation is to answer that question by defending a novel account of epistemic normativity. According to pragmatic epistemic instrumentalism,
doi:10.21985/n2-q7am-wb24
fatcat:wze6r5j6oncgzdc6t2727fhjdu