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AbstractSince Downs proposed that the act of voting is irrational in 1957, myriad models have been proposed to explain voting and account for observed turnout patterns. We propose a model in which partisans consider both the instrumental and expressive benefits of their vote when deciding whether or not to abstain in an election, introducing an asymmetry that most other models do not consider. Allowing learning processes within our electorate, we analyze what evolutionarily stable strategiesdoi:10.1007/s13235-021-00384-1 pmid:34760327 pmcid:PMC8542561 fatcat:seacgfyeufdwvg3wfyvqqyjhmi