All rights reserved. iv DEDICATION I dedicate this dissertation to my husband, who would not let me give up, no matter how difficult the journey became, and to my children, who have made sacrifices to help me achieve this goal. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the members of my committee for their encouragement, support, sharp eyes, and dedication to helping me be the best possible scholar. Dr. Thomas Breslin was exceptionally dedicated to ensuring I reached this goal, not only by

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... tly checking in, but by providing excellent advice and monthly meetings with other Ph.D. Relations staff and faculty have always been supportive and provided an excellent education. Drs. Rebecca Salokar, Harry Gould and Susanne Zwingel were excellent and informative advisors. The PIR staff, including Maria Wilkinson-Diaz, Martha Rodriguez, Maria Elena Gil and Kimberly Noy, were always helpful and caring. I am grateful for support given through three years' worth of teaching assistantships. The professors I worked with, including Drs. , were always supportive. I am also grateful for my professors during my graduate career, including Drs. This case study traced the American reaction to Chinese activities in Africa from the year 2000 to the present. Two keys to understanding how this reaction might unfold were power-transition theory, which predicts that rising states will challenge the hegemon in an international system in order to revise the rules, and status-based competition theories. The U.S. appeared delayed in reacting to competition in Africa from its rising challenger there, China, until it understood that competition to be status-based. A clear, progressive reaction on the part of American leaders was traced. First, there was a split between the reactions of members of Congress and diplomats on-the-ground, who were concerned about China in Africa around the year 2005, and leaders in the White House and State Department, who publicly denied there was any kind of problem. White House and State Department leaders' reaction then grew somewhat as relative gains concerns were activated by economic and power losses in Africa. These leaders then engaged in quiet diplomacy with China and Africa, perhaps to try to socialize China and to moderate its less favorable activities. The U.S. at this time did not seem to be fully aware of the status threat China was presenting. iv