Truth, Representation and Interpretation: The Popper Case

Gerard Stan
2009 Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy  
The aim of this study is to determine several points of reference regarding the way in which Karl Popper built up his philosophical discourse. I locate two specific ways in which Popper interpreted and used ideas belonging to other philosophers. Thus I distinguish in Popper between a projective hermeneutics (where the author uses a thesis that forms a part of his own philosophy in order to reconstruct and understand the ideas of another philosopher) and anideological hermeneutics (where he uses
more » ... a statement expressing an interest of the community whereof he is a member in order to interpret and reconstruct the text of another philosopher). In so doing I also highlight the considerable asymmetry between a representationalist hermeneutics, and a projective and, respectively, an ideological one. Whereas in the first case the interpreter wishes to unveil a truth about the philosophical text, in the other two he israther expressing a desire to talk about himself, his own beliefs and convictions, or about the beliefs of his community of reference.
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