Instance Is the Converse of Aspect

Boris Hennig
2014 Australasian Journal of Philosophy  
According to the aspect theory of instantiation, a particular A instantiates a universal B if and only if an aspect of A is cross-count identical with an aspect of B. This involves the assumption that both particulars and universals have aspects, and that aspects can mediate between different ways of counting things. I will ask what is new about this account of instantiation and, more importantly, whether it is an improvement on its older relatives. It will turn out that the part of it that is
more » ... part of it that is new is the notion of cross-count identity among aspects. As I will show, this notion is both dubious and unnecessary. I will end by presenting a simplified aspect theory of instantiation that does not involve cross-count identity.
doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.962552 fatcat:gk6z6tcomrg3dn2svtowkisblu