A recent theory of emotional intensity argues that emotions are functionally identical to motivational states. Like motivational states, the intensity of an emotion should be a joint function of the importance of instigating events and the magnitude of deterrence to the emotion. -Deterrence‖ is definable as impediments or forces that interfere with the experience or expression of the emotion-reasons for not feeling what one is feeling. When experiencing an emotion, a person will feel it more

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... ensely as the reasons for not feeling that emotion increase, up to a point. When great enough, the reasons for not feeling the emotion overwhelm it and reduce it to a low level. The deterrents investigated thus far have all involved events whose valence opposes the emotion's valence. Two experiments explore the breadth of events that have deterrent power. The first was designed to see if merely anticipating an event of opposite valence has a deterrent effect on an emotion. The second explored whether an affectively neutral stimulus (background noise) would also have deterrent effects. The results of the first experiment partially supported the theory, whereas the results of the second provided complete support. Article: A recent theory Brehm & Brummett, 1998) attempts to explain the determinants of emotional intensity within a framework provided by earlier research on motivational intensity (Brehm &Self, 1989; Wright, 1996; Wright & Brehm, 1989) . Both approaches emphasise immediate contextual and cognitive factors that influence moment-to-moment changes in intensity, such as the importance of an event and the perceived difficulty of instrumental action. Integrating these two areas only requires the assumption that emotional states are fundamentally motivational states. This notion can be traced to the early writings of Darwin (1872/1998) and others (e.g., Lund, 1939; McDougall, 1908 McDougall, / 1960 , although contemporary ideas of emotion and motivation usually take the work of Silvan Tomkins (1962, 1963) and Magda Arnold (1960) as their starting point. Tomkins (1962) argued that emotions are -the basic wants and don't wants of the human being‖ (p. 21). People do not need to learn to like the experience of happiness or dislike the feelings of distress and shame-emotions are inherently rewarding and punishing. The innate significance of emotions enables them to serve as -the primary motivational system‖ (p. 6). Emotions motivate behaviour by making the organism care about certain events and thereby activating and organising other systems (perceptual, cognitive-symbolic, motor) to adapt to the events. But emotions do not simply motivate single actions aimed at single events. The human's core dilemma is that he or she cares about a great many things. People have many important goals and a near infinite number of possible things they could be doing at any given time. The key to an emotion's motivational power is that it changes the momentary significance of a person's many goals. A person encountering a dangerous dog, for example, cares about avoiding the dog and gives little attention to previous actions or thoughts. The notion that  Portions of this article are based on a masters thesis submitted by Paul Silvia to the University of Kansas; thanks are due to Monica Biernat and Chris Crandall for serving as committee members. Experiment 2 was presented at the 1998 meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association in Chicago. Support for development of the theory on which this work is based was provided by a Senior Research Award to Jack W. Brehm from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.