Experiences without for-me-ness? Reconsidering alleged counter examples from psychopathology and psychedelics

Mads Gram Henriksen, Josef Parnas
2020
In contemporary consciousness studies, a central question concerns the nature of the most primitive and fundamental features of phenomenal consciousness. Some authors (e.g., Zahavi) have argued that for-me-ness (or minimal selfhood) is a fundamental and necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness. The concept of for-me-ness articulates that experiences are first-personally manifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience in a way in which they are not given to anybody else.
more » ... veral authors have challenged this claim by presenting what they take to be counter examples, i.e. experiences, which, in their view, lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly rebutting the claim that for-me-ness is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness. In this study, (i) we present the account of for-me-ness, (ii) present three alleged counter examples that come from the domains of psychopathology and psychedelics, and (iii) critically discuss these examples and eventually refute them all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is a necessary, ineliminable feature of phenomenal consciousness.
doi:10.13136/thau.v7i0.99.g90 fatcat:ot7tpm2g65altgf45fo3zplkeq