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Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types
2012
The American Economic Review
We consider the e¢ cient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modelling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payo¤ types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the e¢ cient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a ...nite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of su¢ cient conditions for e¢ cient partial implementation in this classical auction
doi:10.1257/aer.102.3.319
fatcat:6kymshwuk5bq7heancegybbrhe