The choice of a lawyer as a special case of self-insurance-cum-protection

Piotr Dudziński
2014 Mathematica Applicanda  
We consider the problem of choosing a lawyer as a particular case of selfinsurance-cum-protection (SICP) when the lawyer's costs are covered in the case of victory. This problem was introduced by Sevi and Yafil (2005) in the context of selfprotection (SP), with the assumption that the size of a loss does not depend on the level of effort (expenditure on a lawyer). In this paper we drop that assumption and our model considers the possibility that both the loss and probability of incurring a loss
more » ... depend on effort. We compare the optimal effort in our case with the standard one and prove that, according to the modified model of SICP, repayment is a good incentive to invest more. We also show that, unlike in the standard cases of SP and SICP, the level of effort is monotone in the level of risk aversion. We prove that, according to our model, decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) implies that a lawyer's service is a normal good, which is intuitive. We show that for a certain type of increase in risk aversion, the reimbursement effect is stronger than the risk aversion effect. For other changes in risk aversion, there is a probability threshold such that if the probability of a loss is below that level, then the risk-aversion effect prevails. For higher initial probabilities, the reimbursement effect is stronger. 2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: 91B06.
doi:10.14708/ma.v41i2.467 fatcat:bnpb3vawabe2bimgjspulp574i