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Call Center Outsourcing Contracts Under Information Asymmetry
2008
Management science
In this paper we examine contracts to coordinate the capacity decision of a vendor who has been hired by a client to provide call center support. We consider a variety of contracts, all based on our observations of contracts used by one large vendor. We examine the role of different contract features such as pay-per-time, pay-per-call, service level agreements, and constraints on service rates and abandonment. We show how different combinations of these contract features enable client firms to
doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0804
fatcat:eqkjqxefvff4bexug2z5aqzi7e