Call Center Outsourcing Contracts Under Information Asymmetry

Sameer Hasija, Edieal J. Pinker, Robert A. Shumsky
<span title="">2008</span> <i title="Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)"> <a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="" style="color: black;">Management science</a> </i> &nbsp;
In this paper we examine contracts to coordinate the capacity decision of a vendor who has been hired by a client to provide call center support. We consider a variety of contracts, all based on our observations of contracts used by one large vendor. We examine the role of different contract features such as pay-per-time, pay-per-call, service level agreements, and constraints on service rates and abandonment. We show how different combinations of these contract features enable client firms to
more &raquo; ... etter manage vendors when there is information asymmetry about worker productivity. In particular we focus on how different contracts can coordinate by yielding the system-optimal capacity decision by the vendor and consider how profits are allocated between the client and the vendor.
<span class="external-identifiers"> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="">doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0804</a> <a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="">fatcat:eqkjqxefvff4bexug2z5aqzi7e</a> </span>
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