Inefficiency of equilibria in digital mechanisms with continuous valuations

Elena Grigorieva, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Rudolf Müller, Dries Vermeulen
2011 Journal of Mathematical Economics  
E. Grigorieva), p.herings@maastrichtuniversity.nl, P.Herings@algec.unimaas.nl (P.J.J. Herings), r.muller@maastrichtuniversity.nl (R. Müller), d.vermeulen@maastrichtuniversity.nl (D. Vermeulen). 1 We assume quasi-linear utilities. 3 Another possible notion for such game forms would be communication protocol. However, Fadel and Segal (2009) use communication protocol for the combination of an iterative procedure and a particular bidding strategy, and the term binary dynamic mechanism for the
more » ... sive form game induced by their notion of communication protocol. As we like to keep mechanism and strategies separate, but stay consistent with their notation, we opt to not make use of either of the terms communication protocol or binary dynamic mechanism. 0304-4068/$ -see front matter
doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.06.002 fatcat:tubgkqlambhhld5l5a65kxrq44