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Efficient Padding Oracle Attacks on Cryptographic Hardware
[chapter]
2012
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We show how to exploit the encrypted key import functions of a variety of different cryptographic devices to reveal the imported key. The attacks are padding oracle attacks, where error messages resulting from incorrectly padded plaintexts are used as a side channel. In the asymmetric encryption case, we modify and improve Bleichenbacher's attack on RSA PKCS#1v1.5 padding, giving new cryptanalysis that allows us to carry out the 'million message attack' in a mean of 49 000 and median of 14 500
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_36
fatcat:yu47h3tdljghndsrl2o6ikbucu