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Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
2011
Social Science Research Network
This paper studies experimentally the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions with asymmetric information. We implement in the laboratory three examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring. The stage games share the same simple structure, but differ markedly on how information should be optimally used once they are repeated. Despite the complexity of the optimal strategies, the empirical value of
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1803655
fatcat:jd6hdrt4svctljisqid7acebqy