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Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of SciencesOn the one hand, Dignāga supposes in his Pramāṇasamuccaya (part 1) that immediate perceptual experience at every given moment has as its object something that never goes beyond its own actually present content and thus may characterise only itself (svalakṣaṇa). In that respect, svalakṣaṇa appears as a kind of mere presence, sheer momentary actuality. It cannot undergo any external influence or exercise its own influence on other svalakṣaṇas.doi:10.15388/aov.2010.1.3657 fatcat:hnlencvvgzhxhfvpjwlwfkm6mi