A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2020; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is
INEFFECTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BUSYNESS OF INTERNAL BOARD MONITORING COMMITTEES
Corporate Ownership and Control
We examine whether the voluntary formation of a Risk Committee (RC) compromises the effectiveness of other monitoring duties carried out by the board members. We argue that adding more monitoring committees increases the board's internal busyness, which reduces the effectiveness of monitoring by the Audit Committee (AC). Using a sample of financial firms over the period 2007 to 2011 from the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC), we find that voluntarily adopting a risk committee impairs thedoi:10.22495/cocv13i3c2p5 fatcat:lchyqbu235gjxppg65nro6e7d4