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No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
2015
The American Economic Review
Tax evasion generates billions of dollars of losses in government revenue and creates large distortions, especially in developing countries. Claims that the VAT facilitates tax enforcement by generating paper trails on transactions between firms have contributed to widespread VAT adoption worldwide, but there is little empirical evidence about this mechanism. This paper analyzes the role of third party information for VAT enforcement through two randomized experiments among over 400,000 Chilean
doi:10.1257/aer.20130393
fatcat:trmxphpkojgwbeq3hru3m66afi