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Lecturas de Economía
In this paper, we consider a T-stage linear model of Stackelberg oligopoly. First, we show geometrically and analytically that under the two conditions of linear market demand and identical constant marginal costs, the T-stage Stackelberg model reduces to a model where T oligopolies exploit residual demand sequentially. At any stage, leaders behave as if followers did not matter. Second, we study social welfare and convergence toward competitive equilibrium. Especially, we consider the velocitydoaj:73d6801f4c2a4226bedef42b4f1582c5 fatcat:i7mmx6ua55eyhamkl5qeh5gxt4