Building Restriction Covenants: Nuisance: Public Garage

1920 Michigan law review  
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more » ... out Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate--jstor/individuals/early-journal--content. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not--for--profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. MICHIGAN LAW REtIEW MICHIGAN LAW REtIEW MICHIGAN LAW REtIEW recovery. Joost v. Craig, supra; Homan v. Wayer, supra. The notary is not bound to certify as to the title. Overacre v. Blake, 82 Cal. 77, 80. Nor guarantee the correctness of his certificate. DEVLIN, DEEDS, Sec. 527e. AUTOMOBILES-CROSSING ACCIDENT-UNREGISTERED OWNER-VIOLATION OF STATUTE.-In an action by the owner of an automobile, not registered as required by statute, for damages to said vehicle as a result of defendant's alleged negligence in not taking proper precautions to avoid the injury, which consisted in a collision between the machine and defendant's train, it was held that the violation of the statute as to such registration does not, in itself, preclude a recovery. Gilman v. Central Vermont Ry. Co. (Vt., 1919), 107 Atl. 122. In construing a similar statute of Massachusetts, from which the Vermont statute was taken bodily, the Massachusetts court has held in a series of cases, beginning with Dudley v. Northampton St. Ry. Co., 202 Mass. 443, that the Legislature intended to outlaw unregistered automobiles and to give them, as to persons lawfully using the highways, no other right than that of being exempt from wanton or willful injury. It is worthy of notice, moreover, that in the same jurisdiction the court refused to extend that strict rule to cases of injuries by or to registered machines when operated by a person not licensed according to statute. Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. I55. See also Lindsay v. Cecchi, 24 Del. I85. Connecticut refused to follow the doctrine of the Dudley case, supra, in Hemming v. New Haven, 82 Conn. 66I, because the Connecticut statute merely imposed a penalty for failure to register, whereas the statute of Massachusetts expressly forbade the use of the state's highways by such unregistered cars. Stats. Mass. 1903, c. 473, Sec. 3. This distinction is a mere play on words, and shows that the courts will seize upon the least straw as an excuse for not following the Massachusetts rule. Well might the Connecticut court have held flatly against that rule, as did the Vermont court in the instant case, which would appear to be sound, considering the general proposition that, in order to put a person doing an unlawful act beyond the pale of the law for the purpose of a recovery by or against him, the unlawful act must have a causal connection with the injury suffered. 2 R. C. L. I208. In accord with the principal case are Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Weir, 63 Fla. 69, and Hyde v. McCreery, I45 N. Y. App. Div. 729.
doi:10.2307/1277277 fatcat:pza4daumobga7gfnbkxld6eql4