Sponsored Search Auctions with Rich Ads

Ruggiero Cavallo, Prabhakar Krishnamurthy, Maxim Sviridenko, Christopher A. Wilkens
2017 Proceedings of the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web - WWW '17  
The generalized second price (GSP) auction has served as the core selling mechanism for sponsored search ads for over a decade. However, recent trends expanding the set of allowed ad formats-to include a variety of sizes, decorations, and other distinguishing features-have raised critical problems for GSP-based platforms. Alternatives such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction raise di↵erent complications because they fundamentally change the way prices are computed. In this paper we
more » ... this paper we report on our e↵orts to redesign a search ad selling system from the ground up in this new context, proposing a mechanism that optimizes an entire slate of ads globally and computes prices that achieve properties analogous to those held by GSP in the original, simpler setting of uniform ads. A careful algorithmic coupling of allocation-optimization and pricing-computation allows our auction to operate within the strict timing constraints inherent in real-time ad auctions. We report performance results of the auction in Yahoo's Gemini Search platform.
doi:10.1145/3038912.3052703 dblp:conf/www/CavalloKSW17 fatcat:j33neuz5hfa6refgv2puockvbq