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Control Flow and Code Integrity for COTS binaries
2015
Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference on - ACSAC 2015
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) has been recognized as an important low-level security property. Its enforcement can defeat most injected and existing code attacks, including those based on Return-Oriented Programming (ROP). Previous implementations of CFI have required compiler support or the presence of relocation or debug information in the binary. In contrast, we present a technique for applying CFI to stripped binaries on x86/Linux. Ours is the first work to apply CFI to complex shared
doi:10.1145/2818000.2818016
dblp:conf/acsac/ZhangS15
fatcat:chj3krubcneurm6dy2727yc2fi