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Capacity as a Fundamental Metric for Mechanism Design in the Information Economy
[article]
2007
arXiv
pre-print
The auction theory literature has so far focused mostly on the design of mechanisms that takes the revenue or the efficiency as a yardstick. However, scenarios where the capacity, which we define as "the number of bidders the auctioneer wants to have a positive probability of getting the item", is a fundamental concern are ubiquitous in the information economy. For instance, in sponsored search auctions (SSA's) or in online ad-exchanges, the true value of an ad-slot for an advertiser is
arXiv:0711.1569v1
fatcat:sckn34lfubfnphepgzidhjfapy