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MemJam: A False Dependency Attack against Constant-Time Crypto Implementations
[article]
2017
pre-print
Cache attacks exploit memory access patterns of cryptographic implementations. Constant-Time implementation techniques have become an indispensable tool in fighting cache timing attacks. These techniques engineer the memory accesses of cryptographic operations to follow a uniform key independent pattern. However, the constant-time behavior is dependent on the underlying architecture, which can be highly complex and often incorporates unpublished features. CacheBleed attack targets cache bank
doi:10.1007/s10766-018-0611-9
arXiv:1711.08002v1
fatcat:hdc47f52wrh73nv7wjfsow472y