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Articulating Animals: Animals and Implicit Inferences in Brandom's Work
Between the Species An Online Journal for the Study of Philosophy and Animals
Brandom denies animals implicit reasoning by emphasizing their inability to make inferences explicit, and in so doing, denigrates animals by likening their behavior to that of machines and artifacts. With disturbing regularity and ease, Brandom equates pigeons and parrots to machines and thermostats in their inability to express implicit/explicit inferences: neither the pigeon nor the machine can "provid[e] reasons for making other moves in the language game." I contest, however, that animalsdoi:10.15368/bts.2011v14n1.4 fatcat:hvao4reuxvavlmwkiffmy2i76m