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Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. Contrary to the truthful and economically efficient multi-unit Vickrey auction, the Uniform Price Auction encourages strategic bidding and is socially inefficient in general, partly due to a "Demand Reduction" effect; bidders tend to bid for fewer (identical) units, so as to receive them at a lower uniformdoi:10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_20 fatcat:fis6lv24vvdavmvf7v7r6jegka