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Corporate Governance of Banks and Financial Institutions: Economic Theory, Supervisory Practice, Evidence and Policy
European Business Organization Law Review
AbstractBanks are special, and so is the corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions. Empirical evidence, mostly gathered after the financial crisis, confirms this. Banks practicing good corporate governance in the traditional, shareholder-oriented style fared less well than banks having less shareholder-prone boards and less shareholder influence. The special governance of banks and other financial institutions is firmly embedded in bank supervisory law and regulation. Mostdoi:10.1007/s40804-020-00201-z fatcat:tvxpuh3vffdwxelhf22mggt56m