Masking AES With d+1 Shares in Hardware

Thomas De Cnudde, Oscar Reparaz, Begül Bilgin, Svetla Nikova, Ventzislav Nikov, Vincent Rijmen
2016 Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Theory of Implementation Security - TIS'16  
Masking requires splitting sensitive variables into at least d + 1 shares to provide security against DPA attacks at order d. To this date, this minimal number has only been deployed in software implementations of cryptographic algorithms and in the linear parts of their hardware counterparts. So far there is no hardware construction that achieves this lower bound if the function is nonlinear and the underlying logic gates can glitch. In this paper, we give practical implementations of the AES
more » ... sing d + 1 shares aiming at first-and second-order security even in the presence of glitches. To achieve this, we follow the conditions presented by Reparaz et al. at CRYPTO 2015 to allow hardware masking schemes, like Threshold Implementations, to provide theoretical higher-order security with d + 1 shares. The decrease in number of shares has a direct impact in the area requirements: our second-order DPA resistant core is the smallest in area so far, and its S-box is 50% smaller than the current smallest Threshold Implementation of the AES S-box with similar security and attacker model. We assess the security of our masked cores by practical side-channel evaluations. The security guarantees are met with 100 million traces.
doi:10.1145/2996366.2996428 dblp:conf/ccs/CnuddeRBNNR16 fatcat:uj2d7vjp7jclnboe7ukmayqssm