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How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
2003
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge - TARK '03
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally. The complexity of manipulating realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant was recently
doi:10.1145/846267.846268
fatcat:4gniqn7eznh6fns2npwuqjwzf4