VII.—NEW BOOKS

HENRY J. WATT
1911 Mind  
NEW BOOKS. 577 they hare sprung ; to note how, in certain environments and in the faoe of certain vital issued, a ' religious ' type of attitude tends to develop in particular ways, its content and form varying with the external conditions ; in a word, to show how the more important social activities produce a peculiar differentiation of consciousness which, when it has become explicit, may be recognised and marked off as ' religious ' (p. 214). This is Dr. King s result, and it is a result to
more » ... it is a result to which, in the large, we may subscribe. The book has an elaborately analytical table of contents, a selected bibliography, and a fairly full index. In no one of these places-amazing to relate-is reference made to Wundt's Mi/thiis und Religion. P. E. WlKTEB. A First Book in Paycholoyy. By MABY WHTTON CALKUTB. The Macmillan Company, 1910. Pp. xvi, 419. 8s. net. According to Miss Calkins psychology is a science of the self as conscious. The self has at least four fundamental characters; it is (1) relatively persistent; (2) complex; (3) unique; and is (4) experienced as related to objects which are either personal or impersonal. A classification of these objects is attempted. The actual work of the subject starts with the distinction between Perception and Imagination as experiences of the related self. There -are three differences : in perceiving (1) I immediately realise my receptivity or passivity; (2) I realise reflectively the community of my perception with the experience of other selves ; (3) I am related to an object which I regard as independent and external. Study of perception and imagination then proceeds to a consideration of its complexity alone, thereby leading to a review of the structural elements of consciousness or to the procedure of the average psychological text-book. It may be said generally that the references to the self and to the classification of objects only serve as formal or even literary introductions to the usual text of the science. Nothing appears to be achieved by the insistence on the self-aspect. The same must be said of the doctrine of the structural elements of consciousness propounded by Miss Calkins. The question is not even once raised what a psychology can do with the huge heterogeneous mass of elements she distinguishes, except that they fuse. It is considered sufficient merely to enumerate what is apparently unanalysable. That falls into three classes: the sensational (all the qualities, brightness, loudnetts, etc., bigness, volume, etc. ( , the attributive (pleasure, displeasure, attention, consciousness of renlness), the relational (consciousness of one or mure than one, of more or less, of like or different, of the connected or opposed, etc.). The attributive elements are attached to sensational consciousness and the relational are subordinated to two other elemental experiences. The view of McDougall is adopted that there are as many elemental qualities of pitch as there are distinguishable qualities in an octave. Distance or apartness is held to be the simplest form of complex spatial consciousness. • It is not elemental, however, but is " made up of a consciousness of the two-nesu or duality (of sense-objects or qualities) fused with a consciousness of intervening extensity " (p. 67). " When two points touch my skin, I not only perceive the pressure nnd the two-ness, but I imagine the extended pressure of an object stimulating the intervening extensity" (p. 69). "The consciousness of depth-form is not an elementary and unanalysable experience ; rather, it is a consciousness of
doi:10.1093/mind/xx.80.577 fatcat:fwlgkwya45cwnfxwcljh33aure