Čapek's costly route to relativistic presentism

Hayden Wilkinson
2016 Figshare  
There appears to be a clear conflict between presentism and the special theory of relativity, as pointed out by Putnam and Gödel. Čapek contests this by proposing a novel form of 'here-now' presentism under which the existent present is restricted to a single spacetime point. Such a present overcomes many of the criticisms which have plagued previous presentist views and, particularly, provides a definition of the present which is frame-invariant. By doing so, it succeeds in avoiding any direct
more » ... avoiding any direct contradiction with special relativity. In this paper, however, I critique Čapek's formulation of presentism on the grounds of: its implications for the existence of sized objects; and the difficulties it produces for both distant and past events. The view he describes places considerable restrictions on one's worldview and hence, I argue, is not a viable metaphysical position.
doi:10.6084/m9.figshare.3471182.v1 fatcat:dvcxt7lpvjf3dm2pswtj47yshy