Deniable Key Exchanges for Secure Messaging

Nik Unger, Ian Goldberg
2015 Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS '15  
In the wake of recent revelations of mass government surveillance, secure messaging protocols have come under renewed scrutiny. A widespread weakness of existing solutions is the lack of strong deniability properties that allow users to plausibly deny sending messages or participating in conversations if the security of their communications is later compromised. Deniable authenticated key exchanges (DAKEs), the cryptographic protocols responsible for providing deniability in secure messaging
more » ... lications, cannot currently provide all desirable properties simultaneously. We introduce two new DAKEs with provable security and deniability properties in the Generalized Universal Composability framework. Our primary contribution is the introduction of Spawn, the first non-interactive DAKE that offers forward secrecy and achieves deniability against both offline and online judges; Spawn can be used to improve the deniability properties of the popular TextSecure secure messaging application. We also introduce an interactive dual-receiver cryptosystem that can improve the performance of the only existing interactive DAKE with competitive security properties. To encourage adoption, we implement and evaluate the performance of our schemes while relying solely on standard-model assumptions.
doi:10.1145/2810103.2813616 dblp:conf/ccs/UngerG15 fatcat:i5crh7s75ffzzcn4mcdfv4ooca