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Aligning Learning Incentives of Students and Teachers: Results from a Social Experiment in Mexican High Schools
2015
Journal of Political Economy
This paper evaluates the impact of three different performance incentive schemes using data from a social experiment that randomized 88 Mexican high schools with over 40,000 students into three treatment groups and a control group. Treatment 1 provides individual incentives for performance on curriculum-based mathematics tests to students only, treatment 2 to teachers only, and treatment 3 gives both individual and group incentives to students, teachers, and school administrators. Program
doi:10.1086/675910
fatcat:7pw6kwt7sjclbkfqtkihgbz2ma