Commanding and Defining. On Eugenio Bulygin's Theory of Legal Power-Conferring Rules

Gonzalo Villa Rosas
2017 Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía  
This paper aims to explore two objections raised against Bulygin's second approach to the definition of the nature of legal power-conferring rules. According to the first objection, such an account is vague about what is defined by legal powerconferring rules qua constitutive rules. I maintain that this vagueness is rooted in the lack of a suitable definition of legal power. I shall be arguing for the reduction of the complexity of the definientia by defining legal power as a species of
more » ... species of competence. According to the second objection, this non-reductive approach cannot explain the normativity of this kind of rules. Against this approach, it argues that legal powerconferring rules perform a deontic and a definitional function as constitutive rules of legal practice.
doi:10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.182 fatcat:koturooupbhy7jjghvi6hxorma