Intentional binding as Bayesian cue combination: testing predictions with trait individual differences [post]

Peter Lush, Warrick Roseboom, Axel Cleeremans, Ryan Bradley Scott, Anil Seth, Zoltan Dienes
2018 unpublished
Intentional binding refers to the subjective compression of the time between an action and its outcome, typically indicated by a forward shift in the judged time of an action toward its outcome (action binding) and the backward shift of an outcome toward the action that caused it (outcome binding). The effect is considered an implicit measure of the sense of agency as it is sensitive to intentional action without requiring explicit reflection upon agency. One way of explaining the sensitivity
more » ... g the sensitivity of intentional binding is to see it as a simple case of multisensory cue combination in which awareness of intentions increases knowledge of the timing of actions. Here we present results consistent with such a mechanism. An experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding, and may arise from strategically being unaware of one's intentions. Trait differences in the ability to respond to hypnotic suggestion may reflect differing levels of access to motor intentions, with highly hypnotisable people having relatively low access and low hypnotisable people greater access. In a contingent presentation of action and outcome events, low hypnotisables had more precise timing judgements of actions than highs, and showed weaker action binding than highs. These results support the theory that trait hypnotisability is related to access to information related to motor intentions, as increased availability of such information should support more precise judgements of the timing of an intentional action. Intentional binding may thus reflect the Bayesian combination of cross-modal cues.
doi:10.31234/osf.io/4jm3a fatcat:it7k2xcdrrhsjm7nqc2owisnuq