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The social value of information in economies with mandatory savings The social value of information in economies with mandatory savings *

Pablo Beker, Conrado Cuevas, Pablo Beker, Conrado Cuevas
2018 unpublished

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We study the value of public information in a stochastic exchange economy where agents trade assets to reallocate risk and mandatory (retirement) savings imposes a lower bound on the market value of some agents' holdings of a financial asset. Since equilibrium prices depend on the agents' beliefs about the states of nature, the arrival of information shifts the agents' mandatory savings constraints. We show that the arrival of public information can generate an ex-ante Pareto improvement
more » ... e to an uninformative equilibrium even when ex-post improvements are not possible.
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Pablo Beker, Conrado Cuevas, Pablo Beker, Conrado Cuevas. "The social value of information in economies with mandatory savings The social value of information in economies with mandatory savings *." (2018)