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In this article I argue that Sartre's notions of nothingness and "negatity" are not, as he presents it, primarily reactions to Hegel and Heidegger. Instead, they are a reaction to an ongoing struggle with Husserl's notion of intentionality and related notions. I do this by comparing the criticism aimed at Husserl in Sartre's Being and Nothingness to that presented in his earlier work, The Imagination, where he discusses Husserl more elaborately. Furthermore, I compare his criticism to Husserl'sdoi:10.1080/00071773.2017.1387687 fatcat:aus7m3cvgnhynfkp4wphmqv4ma