II.—COLLECTIVE WILLING AND TRUTH

S. ALEXANDER
1913 Mind  
CONTENTS. L Introductory.-The problem stated. 2. experience of other minds. 3. Truth and inter subjective intercourse. 4. Goodness and Truth. 5. Goodness and Truth as coherence. 6. Continued.-Collective and individual believing. 7. The.sdenoe of Truth. 8. Mental propositions. 9. Truth of mental propositions-Mental science. 10. Moral Evil and Error. 11. Relations of truth and practice. 12. Beauty and its relation to truth and goodness. 13. Internal coherence and external success. 14. The success
more » ... ss. 14. The success of truth-Pragmatism. 1 ' Foundations and sketch plan of a conationaJ Psychology,' Britith Journal of Psychology, voL iv., December, 1911, of which the present paper may be regarded as a continuation. I regret that I have seen the work of the six American realists of the platform {The New Realirm. 1912) too late to refer to it in detail. at Cornell University Library on July 15, 2015 http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from Quincentenary Publications, Glasgow, 1911) ; and also of Prof. Meinong, Uber Annahmen, p. 64, jd. 2 (1910). It makes no difference if the phrase, "that etc," stands for an assumption instead of a proposition. We may assert That Cesar should have tailed to cross the Rubicon (or Osesar's failure to cross the Rubicon) might have altered history. Ceeear failed to cross the Rubicon is now an assumption or an assumed fact, but it is still an objective fact (though not a believed fact, still less a true one). Bat it is fact stall, and not timeless. 1 The word belief is used throughout for the object of the judgment; for the -ed and not the -ing, to borrow Mr. Lloyd Morgan's happy shorthand (Inttinet and Experience). In common usage it stands either for the act of believing, or the object believed. But in the plural it alwavs, as far as I can judge, stands for that which is believed, as I use it here. There is the same diversity with other terms; thus interest is a feeling ; bat interests or an interest stands for the objects in which we feel interest, e.g. the phrase, a British interest, or a poetic interest, and the like. (Compare Prof. W. P. Montague's remarks on what he calls psTohophysical metonymy-New Realitm, pp. 356 f.) at Cornell University Library on July 15, 2015 http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from COLLECTIVE WILLING AND TRUTH. 1 Compare as to this the following interesting passage of Shaftesbnry Inquiry Concerning Vxrtiie and Mient, bk. li., pt 2, § 1, p. 128, ed. 1727 : " The courtesans and even the commonest of women, who live by prostitution, know very well how necessary it is that every one whom they entertain with their beauty, should believe there are satisfactions reciprocal ; and that pleasures are no less given than received. And were this imagination to be wholly taken away, there would be hardly any of the at Cornell University Library on July 15, 2015 http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from at Cornell University Library on July 15, 2015 http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from 1 Oh the other hand a practical judgment in one person does or may conflict with a practical judgment in another person, just because it is practical willing. When8idgwick(Afetfcod» of Ethics, I., ui.), in maintaining that the objectivity of moral judgments must belong to Reason and cannot be founded on feeling, urges that if I say Truth should be spoken and yon say Truth should not be spoken, we should have "two coexistent facts stated in two mutually contradictory propositions " (ed. 6, p. 27), he \B treating the practical judgment as if it were merely a speculative act or belief. * Cp.
doi:10.1093/mind/xxii.1.14 fatcat:cabw5pyxpbh4rgxjzusp27tjzq