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http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n2p247A highly influential position in the debate between nomological realists and antirealists (i.e., the debate about the metaphysical status of natural laws) is the regularist theory of laws. Its main feature is the defense of a humean metaphysics which denies the existence of real causal powers and necessary connections in nature. Regularism, however, rely on a traditional reading of Hume's philosophy. In this paper we aim to revisit the discussiondoi:10.5007/1808-1711.2015v19n2p247 fatcat:7sz6dggy4vfzllaw5u5l4eb5e4