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Conventionality and Causality in Lewis-Type Evolutionary Prediction Games
2018
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Barrett and others have used Lewis-style evolutionary games to argue that we ought not to trust our scientific languages to inform us about ontology. More specifically, Barrett has shown that in some simple evolutionary contexts the best descriptive languages need not cut nature at its joints, that they may guide action as successfully as possible while simultaneously being deeply conventional. The present article expands upon Barrett's argument, exploring the space for conventionalism in more
doi:10.1093/bjps/axy076
fatcat:hkw2jqcfivdbpp64hfecm2kpzy