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Scoring Rules and Competitive Behavior in Best-Value Construction Auctions
2016
Journal of construction engineering and management
This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in Best Value or multi-attribute construction auctions, where both the (dollar) bid and technical non-price criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula and abnormally
doi:10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0001144
fatcat:dmlni4sjffedtffa5f5ums4f2u