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Discovery practices in natural sciences: from analogy to preduction
2008
Revista de Filosofia
In this paper I face up to Charles Peirce's view that deduction can never originate any idea whatsoever. According to him new ideas come to science only by means of abduction. I affirm on my side that deductive reasoning can be extended to the context of discovery in mathematical physics. Thus a new form of discovery becomes recognizable. I call it preduction and I claim that it is the way by which many factual hypotheses, theoretical laws and theoretical models are anticipated in physics. I
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