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But What Kind of Badness?: An Inquiry into the Ethical Significance of Pain
In this thesis, I argue against a claim about pain which I call the "Minimization Thesis" or MT. According to MT, pain is objectively unconditionally intrinsically bad. Using the case of grief, I argue that although MT may be true of pain as such, it is not true of particular pains. I then turn to an examination of the justification provided by Thomas Nagle for offering the MT and find that his argument is inadequate because it depends on an implausible phenomenology of pain experience. I arguedoi:10.57709/1953705 fatcat:gv25xckgszbnnej7hvv7zst3qm