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Probabilistic Serial Mechanism for Multi-Type Resource Allocation
[article]
2020
arXiv
pre-print
In multi-type resource allocation (MTRA) problems, there are p > 2 types of items, and n agents, who each demand one unit of items of each type, and have strict linear preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type. For MTRAs with indivisible items, our first result is an impossibility theorem that is in direct contrast to the single type (p = 1) setting: No mechanism, the output of which is always decomposable into a probability distribution over discrete assignments (where no
arXiv:2004.12062v1
fatcat:arrjhjjsn5ecfooma2ezl3gqo4