1915 Mind  
Dozent an der Universitat su Basel. Zweiter Band: Philosophic. Basel: Kober C. F. Spittler's Naobiolger, 1912. Pp. 426. Unbound, 7.50 fr.; bound, 10 fr. THB first volume of this work was reviewed by me in the pages of MIND some time ago (voL xxii., pp. 260-268). On the whole, I can safely say that the second volume not only maintains but surpasses the interest of its predecessor. To begin with a correction, it turns out that, along with other critics, I was mistaken in the expectation that Dr.
more » ... pectation that Dr. Haberlin intended 1 to give us in this volume a piece of constructive ' Weltanschauung '. He now makes dear that from the first he had set himself only the humbler task of inquiring whether the demand of philosophical natures for a ' Weltanschauung' can be satisfied at all; and, if so, what are the most general characters of this satisfaction and how it is to be attained. The firsti volume had analysed 'aoienoe,' or the 'theoretical' form of experience. The second begins with an analysis of ' practical ' experience, ' Handlung' and ' Wertung' being the chief topics, and then goes on to show how both modes of experience are combined and transcended in metaphysics, or the synthetic oonstruotion of a ' Weltanschauung'. Dr. Haberlin's analysis of ' Handlung' covers, in effeot, the same ground as Mr. Bradley's articles on ' Volition,' familiar to readers of MIND. But whereas for Mr. Bradley the dynamics, so to speak, of the will-process depend on the oontraat between ' exiatenoe' and ' idea, and the tendenoy of the idea to realise, itself-the theory taking its oue from ideo-motor action-Dr. Haberlin lays the stress on the play of feelings, their tensions, oonfliots, and mutual reinforcements. His analysis of this side of will-action is exceedingly minute, and the complication of feelings whioh he traces even in a ' gewdhnliohe Handlung,' surprising. The main points of the analysis-taking volition as a peyohioal series or process-are these. The starting-point is a complex ex». perience, partly theoretical, partly practical, vis^ a situation apt prehended, and a ' negative feeling' towards it, i.e., a feeling of dissatisfaction, disapproval, aversion, whioh supplies the dynamic 642 CBITICAIJ NOTICES: element or ' Ausgangs-motiv' (pp. 9, 10). The instability of this experience gives rise, at the next stage, to an idea of an end (' Phantasie-Vorstellung eines Endes ') prefiguring an alteration in the given situation such as to carry with it the promise of a-•positive feeling,' i.e., a feeling of satisfaction or approval, implying a ' positive valuation'. This feeling, so far, is present only in idea (' vorgestellt'): the agent thinks of himself as satisfied by the realisation of the end. The end, however, must not be an object of ' mere' imagination, qualified as unreal or unrealisable. It must be definitely thought of as a ' reality' pressing and demanding to replace the given, a reality which can be, will be, ought to be actual, a reality before which the given is on the very point of yielding. With the idea of an end we get a great complication of feelings. Jn the first place, the end, thought of in anticipation as real, as capable of being realised, and as possessing positive value, gives rise at once to an actual feeling of positive quality. This ' Vorfreude' (p. 43) is essential; Without it we should not act, for mere discontent with the given does not necessarily move us to action. At the same time, qud not yet realised, the end inspires also a negative feeling. The delay, the divorce of the end from existence, is unpleasant. But yet again, in so far aa we think of the end as capable of realisation and about to be realised, there results a further positive feeling. Hence there are always ' drei Begleitgefiihle der Zielphantasie' (p. 15), two positive, one negative. All three are necessary if the will-action is to be completed. If there were no positive feeling, born of the anticipation of satisfaction, there would be no ' wish' for the end; if there were no ' Hoffnungsgefuhl,' born of the thought of the end as realisable, we should be too discouraged to act; if there were no dissatisfaction with the end as not yet realised, it would be nothing more than a mere play of fanoy. The situation may be further complicated when to the thought of the end (Zielphantasie) there is added the thought of myself as realising the end (Ausfuhrungsphantasie), with its full train of varying feelings. And even this does not exhaust the analysis. Complicated as these feelings are, they become infinitely more complicated when between the thought of the end and the given situation there is interposed the thought of a chain of means, whioh carry positive or negative valuationsin their own character, as well as from the point of view of their practicability, apart altogether from the positive value whioh irradiates upon them from the end, as desired, and the negative, feeling similarly extending to them from the end as not yet realised. In the tension and stress of all these feelings, some inhibitory in effect, others impelling, there must be a plus of forwarddriving feeling. The presence of such a positive balance constitutes 'willing' (p. 21). Given this, there follows the second stage of the process of action, viz., the transition from intention (thought
doi:10.1093/mind/xxiv.4.541 fatcat:a67hh7n6kzfclp2ens35p3i55q