Incentive-compatible distributed greedy protocols

Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Gregory Valiant, Aviv Zohar
2011 Proceedings of the 30th annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing - PODC '11  
Under many distributed protocols, the prescribed behavior for participants is to behave greedily, that is, to repeatedly "best respond" to the others' actions. We ask the following general question: "When is it in the best interest of a long-sighted participant to adhere to a distributed greedy protocol? ". We take a game-theoretic approach and exhibit a class of games where greedy behavior (i.e., repeated best-response) is incentive compatible for all players. We identify several environments
more » ... f interest that fall within this class, thus establishing the incentive compatibility of the natural distributed greedy protocol for each. These environments include models of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [4] , that handles routing on the Internet, and of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [3] , and also stable-roommates assignments [2] and cost-sharing [5, 6] , that have been extensively studied in economic theory.
doi:10.1145/1993806.1993871 dblp:conf/podc/NisanSVZ11 fatcat:7bryotbph5bjjfd7oiqizak7xa