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Under many distributed protocols, the prescribed behavior for participants is to behave greedily, that is, to repeatedly "best respond" to the others' actions. We ask the following general question: "When is it in the best interest of a long-sighted participant to adhere to a distributed greedy protocol? ". We take a game-theoretic approach and exhibit a class of games where greedy behavior (i.e., repeated best-response) is incentive compatible for all players. We identify several environmentsdoi:10.1145/1993806.1993871 dblp:conf/podc/NisanSVZ11 fatcat:7bryotbph5bjjfd7oiqizak7xa